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11 Introduction
I construct a tractable framework of competitive search that endogenously generates dis-
persion of prices, wealth and income. With this framework, I investigate the e⁄ects of
long-run in￿ ation and income taxation on the macroeconomy, as well as the interaction of
the two policies. Wealth and income dispersions prevail in modern economies. In the pres-
ence of such distributions, monetary and ￿scal policies are likely to have uneven impacts
on households, generating non-trivial e⁄ects on real activities and welfare. To maximize
welfare, policy makers must have a good understanding of the distributional policy e⁄ects.
In the case where monetary and ￿scal authorities are independent of one another, it is
also important to understand policy interactions. This is particularly relevant given the
context that there have been formulations of central banks and monetary unions, as well
as attempts made to form ￿scal unions in recent years.
Despite its importance, it is a challenging task to study both policies in a heterogeneous-
agent environment. This is because the individual decision problem is generally a⁄ected
by the endogenous wealth distribution. Solving the model involves handling problems
with large dimensions. Policy analysis further enhances the di¢ culty because it entails
computing and comparing equilibrium outcomes in various policy scenarios. Therefore, it
is a rare attempt in the literature to examine the distributional e⁄ects of monetary and
￿scal policies simultaneously.
In my model, households and ￿rms can trade in frictionless and frictional goods markets.
The frictional market contains a variety of submarkets and is characterized by competitive
search. Households make tradeo⁄s between the terms of trade and matching probabilities
when choosing which submarket to participate in. Search is competitive in that both
households and ￿rms take as exogenous the terms of trade and the matching probabilities
across all submarkets. In equilibrium, a submarket that requires a higher payment per
transaction o⁄ers a higher quantity of goods per transaction and also a higher probability
for a buyer to be matched for a transaction. Households face uninsurable idiosyncratic
shocks on labor preferences, which lead to diverse decisions on consumption, precautionary
savings, labor supply and trading strategies. In equilibrium there will arise dispersions of
price, income and wealth.
Competitive search is a critical feature of this model because it o⁄ers signi￿cant tractabil-
ity. Unlike commonly-studied bilateral bargaining in a search environment, here individual
traders cannot a⁄ect any of the market speci￿cations, i.e. terms of trade and matching
probabilities, due to the competitive nature of the search process. With given trading spec-
i￿cations, a household need not consider the amount of money that its potential trading
partner might have, when making its optimal decisions. As a result, the household decision
2problem can be solved without involving the endogenous money distribution, which greatly
reduces the state space and renders the model tractable.
I analytically characterize the stationary equilibrium and the policy e⁄ects on individual
decisions. Policies include long-run money growth maintained by lump-sum transfers and
a proportional income tax. The government balances budget and rebates tax revenues in
a lump-sum manner. I numerically examine the policy implications on the macroeconomy.
The key ￿ndings are the following: First, both policies can directly a⁄ect the intensive
and extensive margins (i.e., the quantity per trade and the trading probability per buyer),
and also indirectly through altering household choices of spending in the frictional market.
Quantitatively, the indirect e⁄ects tend to dominate the direct ones. In￿ ation can stimulate
spending and thus has a positive overall e⁄ect on both margins, while income taxation
does the opposite. Overall, in￿ ation increases output and consumption but decreases
precautionary savings. Income taxation has the opposite e⁄ects.
Second, the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on wealth dispersion depends on the tax regime. The
positive e⁄ect tends to dominate at lower tax rates while the negative e⁄ect tends to
dominate at higher tax rates. Income taxation decreases wealth dispersion regardless
of the monetary policy. Moreover, in￿ ation decreases income inequality but increases
consumption inequality. Taxation has a positive e⁄ect on both income and consumption
inequalities.
Finally, in￿ ation and taxation can respectively have a hump-shape relationship with
welfare. The welfare-improving role of in￿ ation is sensitive to the status of the ￿scal policy.
It is important to coordinate the two policies. Welfare can be maximized by a deviation
from the Friedman rule together with distortionary income taxation. When the monetary
and ￿scal authorities are independent authorities, a change of policy by one has non-trivial
implications on the optimal policy choice of the other.
This framework is based on Rocheteau and Wright (2005; henceforth RW) and Men-
zio, Shi and Sun (2011; henceforth MSS), the former of which studies competitive search
in an environment follows Lagos and Wright (2005; henceforth LW). The LW structure
features quasi-linear preferences and alternating frictional and frictionless markets. It is a
tractable framework because its equilibrium money distribution is degenerate.1 Neverthe-
less, it does not provide insights on the distributional policy e⁄ects. Menzio, Shi and Sun
(2011) construct a tractable monetary environment with non-degenerate money distribu-
tions. Because of competitive search, the model has the feature of block recursivity, which
means that individual decision problems can be solved independently from the endogenous
1Because of its tractability, the unique LW framework has prompted an exploding literature on micro-
founded models of money with an emphasis on market frictions. This literature has recently been recognized
as the New Monetarist Economics (Williamson and Wright, 2010a,b).
3distributions.2 Nevertheless, the framework of MSS abstracts away from money growth.
To analyze policy e⁄ects while maintaining model tractability, I construct a model that
combines the key features of LW/RW and MSS. With quasi-linear preferences, access to
frictionless markets and competitive search, the model is block recursive even in the context
of both monetary and ￿scal policies.
This paper is closely related to the literature of heterogeneous-agent economies that
study the distributional e⁄ect of monetary policy. In these models, money is valued either
because of the cash-in-advance constraint (e.g. Imrohorglu, 1992; Erosa and Ventura, 2002;
Camera and Chien, 2011), or for precautionary purpose (e.g. Akyol, 2004; Wen, 2010;
Dressler, 2011), or due to search frictions (e.g. Molico, 2006; Boel and Camera, 2009; Chiu
and Molico, 2010). In most of these models, agents trade in Walrasian markets. Such
models are not able to generate equilibrium price dispersion. The search model can be a
natural environment to have dispersion of prices, e.g. Molico (2006) and Chiu and Molico
(2010), where agents trade in decentralized markets and bargain bilaterally. In contrast to
search models with bargaining, my model features competitive search, which signi￿cantly
improves tractability. Finally, none of the above literature examines the distributional
e⁄ects of monetary and ￿scal policies simultaneously, which is in contrast the main goal of
my paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the physical model
environment. Section 3 characterizes the stationary equilibrium. Section 4 presents ana-
lytical policy e⁄ects. Section 5 discusses numerical results. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 A Uni￿ed Macroeconomic Framework
2.1 The environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each time period consists of two sub-periods. The
economy is populated by a measure one of ex ante identical households. Each household
consists of a worker and a buyer. All households consume general goods in the ￿rst sub-
period and special goods in the second sub-period. There are di⁄erent types of special
goods. Every period a household faces a random preference shock, which determines with
equal probability the type of special goods to consume in the current period. Household
members share income, consumption and labor cost. The preference of a household in a
2The concept of block recursivity was ￿rst applied to economics by the seminal work of Shi (2009) on
equilibrium wage-tenure contracts. Gonzalez and Shi (2010) and Menzio and Shi (2010a,b; 2011) further
examine the functioning of labor markets using the notion of block recursive equilibrium.
4time period is
U (y;q;l) = U (y) + u(q) ￿ ￿l; (1)
where y is consumption of general goods, q is consumption of special goods and l is labor
input in a time period. The variable ￿ measures the random disutility per unit of labor.
It is i.i.d. across households and over time, and is drawn from the probability distribution




, where 0 < ￿ < ￿ ￿ < 1. The value of ￿ is realized at the
beginning of every period, before any decisions are made. The functions u and U are
twice continuously di⁄erentiable and have the usual properties: u0 > 0, U0 > 0; u00 < 0,
U00 < 0; u(0) = U (0) = u0(1) = U0(1) = 0; and u0 (0) and U0 (0) being large but ￿nite.
Households discount future with factor ￿ 2 (0;1). All goods are perishable across sub-
periods. There is no insurance on idiosyncratic risks. Nor is borrowing or lending feasible
among households. There is a ￿at object called money, which is storable without cost.
General goods are traded in competitive and frictionless markets. Special goods are
traded in frictional markets in that trades are decentralized and that buyers and sellers
are randomly matched in pair-wise meetings. Trading frictions are driven by households￿
random demand for special goods. There is a measure one of competitive ￿rms. Firms
hire workers from households, who own equal shares of all ￿rms. The labor market is
competitive. Labor is hired at the beginning of a period and is used in production for
both general and special goods. Each ￿rm can organize production of general goods and
one type of special goods. In each period the frictionless goods market opens in the ￿rst
sub-period, followed by the frictional market in the second sub-period.3
Trading in a frictional market is characterized by competitive search. This market
contains a variety of submarkets. Each submarket is characterized by (x;q;b;s), where
(x;q) are the terms of trade and (b;s) are the respective matching probabilities for a buyer
and a shop. Search is competitive in the sense that households and ￿rms take as given
the characteristics of all submarkets, when making their trading decisions. Buyers and
shops are randomly matched in a pair-wise manner because households and ￿rms cannot
coordinate. A buyer can enter at most one submarket in each period. Firms have free entry
to all submarkets and choose the measure of shops to operate in each submarket. The cost
of operating a shop for one period is k > 0 units of labor. Moreover, producing q units
of special goods requires   (q) units of labor, where   is twice continuously di⁄erentiable
with the usual properties:  
0 > 0,  
00 ￿ 0 and   (0) = 0. In equilibrium free entry of
￿rms is such that the characteristics of submarkets are consistent with the speci￿ed ones.
3In this environment, one can also assume that the frictionless and frictional goods markets open
simultaneously in a period. The results are similar to the sequential order of markets. Here I adopt the
sequential structure for expositional convenience.
5The matching technology has constant returns to scale and is such that s = ￿(b). In
equilibrium the matching probabilities of each submarket become functions of the terms
of trade (x;q), as is shown in (4). Therefore, a submarket can be su¢ ciently indexed by
(x;q). I impose the following assumption:
Assumption 1 For all b 2 [0;1], the matching function ￿(b) satis￿es: (i) ￿(b) 2 [0;1],
with ￿(0) = 1 and ￿(1) = 0, (ii) ￿0 (b) < 0, and (iii) [1=￿(b)] is strictly convex, i.e.,
2(￿0)
2 ￿ ￿￿00 > 0.
I focus on the steady state equilibrium and suppress the time index throughout the
paper. The per capita money stock is ￿xed at M for now. I will allow money growth and
income taxation when I analyze policy e⁄ects in section 4. Labor is the numeraire. In
particular, let m denote the real value of a household￿ s money balance measured in terms
of labor units. Let w denote the normalized wage rate, which is the nominal wage rate
divided by the money stock M. Then the dollar amount associated with a balance m is
(wM)m.
2.2 A ￿rm￿ s decision
In the frictionless market, a representative ￿rm takes the general-good price as given and
chooses output Y to maximize pro￿t. For simplicity, it takes one unit of labor to produce
one unit of general goods. Let p be the price of general goods, measured in terms of labor.
In the frictional market, the ￿rm takes the terms of trade for each submarket, (x;q), as
given and chooses the measure of shops, dN (x;q), to set up in each submarket. Recall
that a shop is matched by a buyer with probability s(x;q). For a particular shop in the
submarket, the operational cost is k units of labor and the expected cost of production is
  (q)s(x;q) units of labor. A shop￿ s expected revenue is xs(x;q), where the revenue x is
measured in labor units. The ￿rm￿ s total pro￿t in a period is
￿ = max
Y
fpY ￿ Y g + max
dN(x;q)
￿Z
fxs(x;q) ￿ [k +   (q)s(x;q)]gdN (x;q)
￿
. (2)
The ￿rst item on the right-hand side denotes the ￿rm￿ s pro￿t in the frictionless market
and the second item its pro￿t in the frictional market. Free entry of ￿rms implies that the
￿rm earns zero pro￿t and thus p = 1 in equilibrium. Zero-pro￿t in the frictional market
requires
s(x;q)[x ￿   (q)] ￿ k and dN (x;q) ￿ 0; (3)
where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. In particular, if the ex-
pected pro￿t of operating a shop s(x;q)[x ￿   (q)] ￿ k < 0, then the ￿rm will choose
6dN (x;q) = 0. If s(x;q)[x ￿   (q)] ￿ k = 0, the ￿rm is indi⁄erent across any dN (x;q) 2
(0;1). It is not an equilibrium to have s(x;q)[x ￿   (q)] ￿ k > 0 because it would at-
tract the ￿rm to choose dN (x;q) = 1, which contradicts zero-pro￿t. As is common in
the competitive search literature,4 I focus on equilibria where condition (3) also holds for
submarkets not visited by any buyer. Given that the trading probabilities b;s 2 [0;1],
condition (3) implies
s(x;q) = ￿(b(x;q)) =
(
k
x￿ (q); if k < x ￿   (q)
1, if k ￿ x ￿   (q).
(4)
The free-entry condition pins down the matching probabilities in a submarket as functions
of the terms of trade. Indeed, a submarket can be su¢ ciently indexed by the terms of
trade, (x;q).
2.3 A household￿ s decision
2.3.1 Decision in the frictionless market
Let W (m;￿) be a household￿ s value at the beginning of a period with real money balance
m and the random realization ￿. Given price p and the characteristics of all frictional
submarkets, a household maximizes its value by choosing consumption of general goods
y ￿ 0, labor input l ￿ 0, the real balance to spend in the frictional market z ￿ 0, and
precautionary savings h ￿ 0.5 If the household￿ s buyer is matched with a shop in the
frictional market, then the buyer spends z and the household carries h into the following
period. Otherwise, the household carries a balance z + h into the following period. More-
over, z +h ￿ ￿ m, where ￿ m is the maximum real money balance that a household can carry
across periods. I assume 0 < ￿ m < U0￿1 ￿￿ ￿
￿
. The dividend ￿ is paid to the household at
the end of a period. In equilibrium ￿ = 0 because ￿rms earn zero pro￿t.
4For example, Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), and Menzio, Shi and Sun (2011). Given
such beliefs o⁄ the equilibrium, markets are complete in the sense that a submarket is inactive only if the
expected revenue of the only shop in the submarket is lower than its expected cost given that some buyers
are present in the submarket. Such a restriction can be justi￿ed by a ￿trembling-hand￿argument that an
in￿nitely small measure of buyers appear in every submarket exogenously.
5Without the ￿-shock, the household has no incentive to choose h > 0, not even when ￿ is permanently
heterogeneous across households. With this preference shock, the household saves (more than any unspent
balance z) in a low-￿ state to help ease future disutility of labor. Therefore, the role of the preference
shock here is not only to generate endogenous distributions but also to induce precautionary savings.
7The value W (m;￿) satis￿es the following Bellman equation:
W (m;￿) = max
(y;l;z;h)
fU (y) ￿ ￿l + V (z;h)g (5)
s:t: py + z + h ￿ m + l:
The constraint in the above is a budget constraint.6 The function V (z;h) is the household￿ s
value at the beginning of the second sub-period, i.e., immediately before the frictional
market opens. Because the analysis on the decisions of frictional trading is much involved,
I will postpone fully characterizing V until the next sub-section. In Lemma 3, I show that
V is di⁄erentiable and concave in z and h. For now, I take such information as given.
Given U0 > 0, the budget constraint must hold with equality and thus
l = y + z + h ￿ m; (6)
where I have incorporated the equilibrium price p = 1. For now I assume that the choice
of l is interior, which I will verify later. Using (6) to eliminate l in the objective function
yields
W (m;￿) = ￿m + max
y fU (y) ￿ ￿yg + max
z;h
fV (z;h) ￿ ￿(z + h)g: (7)
The optimal choices must satisfy the following ￿rst-order conditions:
U
0 (y) ￿ ￿; and y ￿ 0 (8)
Vz (z;h)
(
￿ ￿; and z ￿ 0




￿ ￿; and h ￿ 0
￿ ￿; and h ￿ ￿ m ￿ z
(10)
6Note that the household￿ s spending in the frictional market is not constrained by its initial money
holdings of the period. This is because in this environment both money and ￿rm IOUs can be used in all
transactions. Firm IOUs take the form of a ￿rm￿ s promise of wage payments at the end of a period, in
terms of money. Firm IOUs are settled in a central clearinghouse at the end of a period. Such IOUs are
enforceable because ￿rms are large (in the sense that each of them owns a positive measure of shops) and
thus they have deterministic revenues and costs, although individual shops face matching risks. Firms last
for one period and new ones are formed at the beginning of the next. Thus ￿rm IOUs can be circulated
for only one period. Nevertheless, personal IOUs of households are not accepted as a medium of exchange
because households face idiosyncratic preference and matching risks and there is no enforcement on their
IOUs. No particular type of goods is cash goods in this environment because both ￿at money and ￿rm
IOUs can be used in all transactions. This is in contrast with standard money search models, where goods
traded in the frictional markets are considered cash goods. In these models, ￿at money must be used as a
medium of exchange to overcome the lack of double coincidence of wants and record-keeping of individual
traders.




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ < U
0 (￿ m) < U
0 (0)




. Then condition (8) implies that the choice of y is always interior and
satis￿es
U
0 (y) = ￿: (11)
Clearly, the household￿ s current money balance m does not a⁄ect the optimal choices of y,
z or h, although it does a⁄ect l. Let the policy functions be y (￿), z (￿), h(￿) and l(m;￿).




and that m ￿ ￿ m. Therefore, (6) and (11)
imply that l(m;￿) ￿ U0￿1 ￿￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ m > 0 for all (m;￿). That is, all households￿choices of l
are interior given that U0￿1 ￿￿ ￿
￿
> ￿ m. Given (7), the value function W is
W (m;￿) = W (0;￿) + ￿m; (12)
where
W (0;￿) = U (y (￿)) ￿ ￿y (￿) + V (z (￿);h(￿)) ￿ ￿[z (￿) + h(￿)]:
(13)
The preceding exposition proves the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The value function W is continuous and di⁄erentiable in (m;￿). It is also
a¢ ne in m.
2.3.2 Decision in the frictional market
The household chooses whether to participate in the frictional market. If yes, then it
chooses which submarket to enter and search for a trade. Given balances z and h, the
household is faced with the following problem at the beginning of the second sub-period:
max
x;q fb(x;q)[u(q) + ￿E [W (z ￿ x + h;￿)]] + [1 ￿ b(x;q)]￿E [W (z + h;￿)]g;
(14)
where q ￿ 0, x ￿ z and b(x;q) is determined by (4). It is convenient to use condition (4)

















+ ￿E [W (z + h;￿)]: (15)


















































2 ￿ 0; and b ￿ 0;
(17)
where the two sets of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. It has been taken
into account in condition (17) that b = 1 cannot be an equilibrium outcome. This is
because b = 1 implies s = 0. This further implies that ￿rms choose dN (z;q) = 1 and
earn strictly positive pro￿t, which violates free entry. Let the policy functions be x(z),
b(z) and q (z), where q (z) is implied by condition (4):








If b(z) = 0, then the choices of x and q are irrelevant. In this case, the household chooses
not to participate in the frictional submarket. Without loss of generality, I impose x(z) = z
if b(z) = 0.
Now consider z such that b(z) > 0. It is obvious from (15) that the optimal choices
are independent of z if the money constraint does not bind, i.e., x(z) < z. De￿ne ￿(q) ￿
u0 (q)= 




￿1 [￿E (￿)]: (19)
Given q￿, using (18) to eliminate x in (17) yields
u(q















2 = 0: (20)
It is straightforward to show that the left-hand side of (20) is strictly increasing in b￿.
















Given unique values of q￿ and b￿, x￿ is uniquely determined by
x





Therefore, if condition (21) holds, then x(z) = z for all z < x￿ and x(z) = x￿ for all
z ￿ x￿. If condition (21) fails to hold, then x(z) = z for all z ￿ 0. De￿ne ^ z as the
maximum value such that x(z) = z. Thus ^ z = x￿ if (21) holds and ^ z = 1 otherwise.
In this environment, it is not necessary for the household to choose z higher than the
amount x that it plans to spend in the frictional market. Without loss of generality, I
impose x(z) = z in the rest of the analysis. In particular, consider z 2 [0; ^ z]. Given such
z, the problem in (15) becomes
B (z) + ￿E [W (z + h;￿)]; (23)
where
















The value B (z) is the household￿ s expected trade surplus. If b > 0, it must be the case










￿ ￿E (￿)z > 0: (25)
Moreover, the optimal choice of b satis￿es condition (17) given x = z.
Lottery choice. It is necessary to mention that the value function B (z) may not be
concave in z because the objective function in (24) may not be jointly concave in its state
and choice variables, (z;b). This objective function involves the product between the choice
variable b itself and a function of b. Even if both of these two terms are concave, the product
may not be jointly concave. Above all, it is unclear whether either of the two terms is a
concave function of z, given that b is a choice variable and is yet to be determined. To make
the household￿ s value function concave, I introduce lotteries with regards to the balance
z, as in Menzio, Shi and Sun (2011). In particular, lotteries are available every period
immediately before trading in the frictional market takes place.
A lottery is characterized by (L1;L2;￿1;￿2). If a household plays the lottery, it will
11win the prize L2 with probability ￿2. The household loses the lottery with probability ￿1,
in which case it receives a payment of L1. There is a complete set of lotteries available.
Given z, a household￿ s optimal choice of lottery solves:
~ V (z) = max
(L1;L2;￿1;￿2)
f￿1B (L1) + ￿2B (L2)g (26)
subject to
￿1L1 + ￿2 L2 = z; L2 ￿ L1 ￿ 0;
￿1 + ￿2 = 1; ￿i 2 [0;1] for i = 1;2:
Denote the policy functions as Li (z) and ￿i (z), respectively, where i = 1;2. If the house-
hold is better o⁄ not playing any lottery, it is trivial to see that L1 (z) = L2 (z) = z.
Figure 1. Lottery Choice
Figure 1 illustrates how the lottery can help make the value function ~ V (z) concave, even
though the function B (z) has some strictly convex part. It is intuitive to see that a
household will choose to play a lottery if it has a very low balance. As is shown in Figure
1, for any balance z 2 (0;z0), it is optimal for the household to participate in the lottery
o⁄ering the prize z0. The lottery makes ~ V (z) linear whenever B (z) is strictly convex. The
properties of z0 are presented in part (iii) of Lemma 2.
2.3.3 Properties of value and policy functions
Lemma 2 The value function B (z) is continuous and increasing in z 2 [0; ^ z]. The value
function ~ V (z) is continuous, di⁄erentiable, increasing and concave in z 2 [0; ^ z]. For z
such that b(z) = 0, the value function B(z) = 0. In this case, the choice of q is irrelevant.
There exists z > 0 such that b(z) > 0 if and only if there exists q > 0 that satis￿es
u(q) ￿ ￿E (￿)[  (q) + k] > 0: (27)
12For z such that b(z) > 0, the value function B (z) is di⁄erentiable, B(z) > 0 and B0(z) > 0.
Moreover, the following results hold: (i) The policy functions b(z) and q (z) are unique and
strictly increasing in z. In particular, b(z) solves








2 = 0; (28)
where








Moreover, b(z) strictly decreases in E (￿) while q (z) strictly increases in E (￿); (ii) There
exists z1 > k such that b(z) = 0 for all z 2 [0;z1] and b(z) > 0 for all z 2 (z1; ^ z]; (iii)
There exists z0 > z1 such that a household with z < z0 will play the lottery with the prize
z0. Moreover, B (z0) = ~ V (z0) > 0, B0 (z0) = ~ V 0 (z0) > 0 and b(z0) > 0.
Lemma 2 (see Appendix A for a proof) summarizes the properties of the household￿ s
value and policy functions in the frictional market. According to part (i), the optimal
choices of (q;b) are strictly increasing in z when the household chooses b > 0 to participate
in frictional trading. In this case, the higher a balance the household spends, the higher a
quantity it obtains and the higher the matching probability at which it trades. As a result,
households endogenously sort themselves into di⁄erent submarkets based on their balances
to spend. For any given z, a higher value of E (￿) implies a lower matching probability for
the buyer and a higher amount of goods to be purchased by the buyer. The intuition is the
following: Given higher E (￿), it becomes more costly for ￿rms to hire labor. Firms respond
by setting up fewer shops in a submarket but increasing quantity produced per trade. This
helps save the ￿xed cost of operating shops and steer more labor into production. All else
equal, more shops in a submarket lead to a higher matching probability for a shop, which
tends to increase a ￿rm￿ s revenue. Thus the ￿rm can a⁄ord to o⁄er a higher quantity per
trade, even though it requires a higher labor input. In this case, households face a lower
matching probability for a buyer. Nevertheless, the households are compensated by an
increase in the quantity per purchase.
Recall that V is the value of a household at the beginning of the second sub-period
before trading decisions are made. Given (12), (23), (24) and (26), V is given by
V (z;h) = ~ V (z) + ￿E [W (0;￿)] + ￿E (￿)(z + h): (30)




fV (z;h) ￿ ￿(z + h)g: (31)
It follows that h(￿) > 0 if and only if ￿ is such that ~ V 0 (z (￿)) = 0, that is, if z (￿) = x￿
as de￿ned in (22). In this case, h(￿) = ￿ m ￿ x￿. For all ￿ such that z (￿) < x￿, it must be
that h(￿) = 0. Then (6) implies
l(m;￿) =
(
y (￿) + ￿ m ￿ m; if z (￿) = x￿
y (￿) + z (￿) ￿ m; if z (￿) < x￿:
(32)
Given Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is trivial to derive the following lemma:
Lemma 3 (i) V is continuous and di⁄erentiable in (z;h). The function V (￿;h) is increas-
ing and concave in z 2 [0; ^ z], with V (z;h) ￿ ￿E [W (0;￿)] > 0 for all z. Moreover, V (z;￿)
is a¢ ne in h. If ￿ is such that z (￿) = x￿, then h(￿) = ￿ m ￿ x￿. Otherwise, h(￿) = 0;
(ii) Policy functions y (￿), z (￿) and h(￿) are decreasing functions. The policy function
l(m;￿) is decreasing in both m and ￿.
3 Stationary Equilibrium
De￿nition 1 A stationary equilibrium consists of household values (W;B; ~ V ;V ) and choices
(y;l;z;h;(q;b);(L1;L2;￿1;￿2)); ￿rm choices (Y;dN (x;q)); price p and wage rate w. These
elements satisfy the following requirements: (i) Given the realizations of shocks, asset bal-
ances, prices and terms of trade, a household￿ s choices solve (7), (24), (26) and (30), which
induce the value functions W(m;￿), B(z), ~ V (z) and V (z;h); (ii) Given prices and terms of
trade, ￿rms maximize pro￿t and solve (2); (iii) Free entry condition: The function s(x;q)
satis￿es (4); (iv) All labor markets, general-good markets and money markets clear; (v)
Stationarity: All quantities, prices and distributions are time invariant; (vi) Symmetry:
Households in the same idiosyncratic state make the same optimal decisions.
The above de￿nition is self-explanatory. The labor-market-clearing condition implies











￿i (z (￿))[1 ￿ b(Li (z (￿)))]Li (z (￿))dF (￿): (33)
I derive the above market-clearing condition in Appendix D. Given the equilibrium de￿n-
ition, I have the following theorem (see Appendix B for a proof):
14Theorem 2 A stationary equilibrium exists. It is unique if and only if the lottery choices
fL1 (z (￿));L2 (z (￿));￿1 (z (￿));￿2 (z (￿))g are unique for all z (￿). Moreover, the following
results hold: (i) The general-good consumption y (￿) > 0 for all ￿; (ii) If there does not
exist q > 0 that satis￿es condition (27), then z (￿) = 0 for all ￿. Otherwise, z (￿) > 0 for
some ￿.
According to Theorem 2, frictionless markets are always active, while frictional markets
are not. A necessary condition for frictional markets to be used is that condition (27) holds
for some q > 0. This condition depends on the preferences and the production technology
for special goods, the discount factor and the value of E (￿). Intuitively, if the utility
derived from consuming special goods is too low, or if the production cost of special goods
is too high, consumption of special goods can become too costly, especially considering the
uncertainty involved in obtaining such goods. Similarly, if E (￿) is too high, then the cost
of labor is high, which drives up the cost of producing special goods and hence suppresses
the demand. These results are consistent with the ￿ndings in Camera (2000). In a model
without distributional components, Camera shows that the frictional market is used in
equilibrium when households can have su¢ ciently high expected consumption relative to
that in the frictionless market.
Note that this equilibrium is remarkably tractable. None of the decision problems (7),
(24), (26) and (30) is a⁄ected by the endogenous money distribution. Therefore, one can
solve these decision problems ￿rst, and then use the household optimal decisions to derive
the equilibrium aggregates, together with income and wealth distributions. This model
property is called block recursivity.
4 Policy E⁄ects
I now analyze the e⁄ects of monetary and ￿scal policies. Consider that the money stock
per capita evolves according to M0 = ￿M, where ￿ ￿ ￿ is the money growth rate and M0 is
the money stock of the next period. Money growth is achieved by a lump-sum transfer from
the government to households, and vice versa for money contraction. The government also
imposes a proportional tax rate ￿ 2 [0;1) on wage income. The government balances its
budget every period. All tax revenues are redistributed from the government to households
in a lump-sum manner. Transfers are made at the beginning of each period. All tax
payments and transfers are made with money. The money market opens in the second
subperiod of a period.
First, it is straightforward to show that @y (￿)=@￿ ￿ 0 and @y (￿)=@￿ = 0. The former
is a standard income e⁄ect and the latter is also a standard result in the macro literature.
15Second, policies directly a⁄ect equilibrium trading strategies, q (z) and b(z). The e⁄ect on
q (z) is called the intensive-margin e⁄ect and the one on b(z) the extensive-margin e⁄ect.
Even with policies, all the results in Lemma 2 still hold, except that the policy functions
b(z) and q (z) are jointly determined by
u(q (z)) ￿
￿E (￿)









2 = 0 (34)








instead of (28) and (29). Then follows a proposition on policy e⁄ects (see Appendix C for
a proof):
Proposition 1 For all z such that b(z) > 0, the following results hold:
(i) Given z, ￿scal policy ￿ has a positive direct e⁄ect on the intensive margin and a
negative direct e⁄ect on the extensive margin, i.e.,
@q(z;￿)
@￿ > 0 and
@b(z;￿)
@￿ < 0;
(ii) Given z, monetary policy ￿ has a negative direct e⁄ect on the intensive margin and
a positive direct e⁄ect on the extensive margin, i.e.,
@q(z;￿)
@￿ < 0 and
@b(z;￿)
@￿ > 0;
(iii) Fiscal policy has a negative e⁄ect on spending z, i.e.,
@z(￿;￿)
@￿ < 0. By decreasing
z (￿), ￿scal policy ￿ has a negative indirect e⁄ect on both margins b and q. The e⁄ect of
monetary policy on z is ambiguous and hence the indirect e⁄ect of monetary policy on both
margins is also ambiguous;
(iv) On the extensive margin, the overall ￿scal policy e⁄ect is negative. The ￿scal policy
e⁄ect on the intensive margin is ambiguous given the opposing direct and indirect e⁄ects.
Proposition 1 characterizes both direct and indirect policy e⁄ects on intensive and
extensive margins, b(z) and q (z). Each policy has a direct impact on the choices of b
and q, as well as an indirect one through a⁄ecting the choice of spending z. Part (i)
summarize the direct e⁄ects of proportional income taxes. A higher income tax rate ￿
makes households frugal on spending. For any given balance, a household chooses to visit
a submarket that o⁄ers a higher quantity of goods per trade, which is a positive e⁄ect on
the intensive margin. In such a submarket, a ￿rm￿ s cost of production per trade is higher.
Thus it reduces overall cost by setting up a smaller measure of shops in this submarket.
This imposes a negative e⁄ect along the extensive margin.
Part (ii) of Proposition 1 lists the direct monetary policy e⁄ects on the margins. In
particular, the real value of a money balance over time decreases with money growth. A
household responds by sending its buyer to a submarket with a higher matching probability
16b, in order to increase the chance of spending money in the current period. In such a
submarket, the matching probability for a shop is lower, which all else equal implies a
lower pro￿t for ￿rms. Zero pro￿t condition requires that ￿rms must be compensated by
producing a lower quantity per trade. These results of monetary policy are standard and
have been well-documented in the money search literature.
Part (iii) shows that income taxes reduce spending z, which is an income e⁄ect. Thus
taxation also has a negative indirect e⁄ect on the margins because b and q are increasing
in z. Money growth has an ambiguous e⁄ect on z. Intuitively, in￿ ation tax weakens a
household￿ s incentives for precautionary savings, which causes a positive e⁄ect on z as the
household switches some savings (future consumption) to spending on current consumption.
On the other hand, money growth also has a negative e⁄ect on z as the household has the
incentives to reduce spending in the frictional market. This is because an unmatched
participation in the frictional market will result in the household carrying the unspent
money balance into the future and bearing the in￿ ation tax. If the household values
consumption of special goods high enough, the ￿rst e⁄ect dominates and thus in￿ ation can
have a positive indirect e⁄ect on both margins by increasing z (￿). The result in part (iv)
is self-explanatory and follows directly from the previous parts.
Finally, it is worthwhile mentioning that all the results in parts (i), (iii) and (iv) of
Proposition 1 are novel analytical results in the current literature on search-theoretic mod-
els of money. The literature has rarely analyzed the e⁄ect of ￿scal policy on frictional
trading strategies, let alone in a heterogeneous-agent environment.
5 Numerical Results
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As the benchmark computation, I adopt the following parameter values:
￿ U0 a ￿ ￿u ￿ k ￿ ￿ m ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
0:96 20 10￿3 1:01 2 1:5 0:01 1 2 0:5 1:5 [￿;2] [0;0:25]
(37)
The model period is set to be one year. The discount factor ￿ is chosen to match an annual
interest rate of 4%. For the utility functions, I take ￿ = 1:01 as a normalization. The value
￿u = 2 is typical in the macro literature. The constant a is used to satisfy U(0) = 0. For
17the production function, ￿ is chosen such that the production function takes the form of
output Q = L2=3 as in a standard RBC model. The cost k is set to a small number. The
matching technology is the so-called telegraph matching function. With ￿ = 1, the number
of matches in a submarket with Nb buyers and Ns shops is NbNs=(Nb + Ns). I restrict





such that all households ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ have interior labor choices under the considered policy
values. This is important for tractability because it allows one to transform the decision
problem (5) into (7). This way, the household￿ s choices of (y;z;h;q;b;L1;L2;￿1;￿2) are
independent of the state variable m and also the money distribution. After the benchmark





Computation strategy. This model is block recursive even with monetary and ￿scal
policies. The decision problems are listed in (41)-(44), none of which is a⁄ected by equi-
librium distributions. For simulations, one can ￿rst solve these problems, and then derive
the equilibrium wage rate, the government transfer and the macro aggregates using the
formulas presented in Appendix D.
Policy functions. Panel A of Figure 2 depicts a household￿ s optimal lottery choice
given balance z. In particular, z0 = 0:027. That is, any household with z 2 (0;0:027) will
play the lottery of receiving either a payment of 0:027 or nothing. For households with
z > 0:027, the functions L1 (z) and L2 (z) almost always coincide, indicating that the lottery
is almost never played at higher z values. Moreover, for the policy parameters considered




never chooses z (￿) ￿ 0:027. Therefore, the lottery
choice is quantitatively negligible in this numerical exercise. For expositional convenience,
I will ignore lotteries when presenting the rest of the numerical results. Nevertheless, all
computation results presented in this paper are carried out with the lottery choice.
Panel B of Figure 2 depicts the policy functions under various policy regimes. In the top
right panel of Figure 2￿B, the blue curve coincides with the green curve and is completely
blocked by the latter. In the bottom three panels, all three colored curves are not always
discernible in the graphs because they often coincide with one another. In each panel, a
shift from the blue curve to the red one represents the e⁄ect of an increased income tax
rate (from ￿ = 0 to ￿ = 0:25) given a money growth rate (￿ = 0:96). Similarly, a shift
from the blue curve to the green one represents the e⁄ect of an increased money growth
rate (from ￿ = 0:96 to ￿ = 1:18) given the ￿scal policy (￿ = 0). A few observations follow
immediately:
S1. y (￿), z (￿) and h(￿) are decreasing functions, while b(z) and q (z) are increasing
18functions. This con￿rms the corresponding results in Lemmas 2 and 3;
S2. (a) Consider a given ￿. For any ￿, a higher ￿ decreases z (￿) and y (￿), but increases
savings h(￿). The e⁄ect of ￿ on z is consistent with part (iii) of Proposition 1.
(b) Consider a given ￿. Money growth increases the transaction balance z (￿) but
decreases savings h(￿). It has no e⁄ect on y (￿). According to part (iii) of Proposition
1, the e⁄ect of ￿ on z can be either positive or negative. Here the numerical results
suggest that the positive e⁄ect dominates.
(c) There is equilibrium price dispersion as the equilibrium prices z (￿)=q (z (￿)) vary
with the realizations of ￿.
(d) Neither ￿ nor ￿ has a signi￿cant impact on the functions b(z), q (z) or the price
function z=q (z). This suggests that the direct policy e⁄ects summarized in parts
(i)-(ii) of Proposition 1 can be quantitatively small.
The results in S2 are intuitive. All else equal, a higher income tax rate makes it more
costly to supply labor. Accordingly, the household saves more and becomes more frugal on
spending. However, the higher tax rate stimulates precautionary savings because it helps
alleviate the elevated disutility of labor supply in a higher-￿ state. In￿ ation has no e⁄ect
on consumption of goods traded in the frictionless market, which is a standard result. All
else equal, in￿ ation tax causes the household to save less yet spend more on goods traded
in the frictional market.
Aggregate margins, output and labor.
S3. In￿ ation has a positive e⁄ect on both of the aggregate intensive and extensive mar-
gins, while the tax rate has a negative e⁄ect on them. In￿ ation increases aggregate
output and labor in the frictional market, while the income taxes decrease such ag-
gregates.
Figure 3 depicts the policy e⁄ects on aggregate intensive and extensive margins. The
￿rst column is for the intensive margin, i.e. average quantity per trade in the frictional
market, and the second column is for the extensive margin, i.e. volume of transactions in
the frictional market. The ￿rst row shows the monetary policy e⁄ect and the second row
is for the ￿scal policy. Figure 4 shows the policy e⁄ects on aggregate output and labor in
the frictional market. Recall from S2 and Figure 2 that the direct policy e⁄ects on the
optimal choices of (b;q) are quantitatively small and are dominated by the indirect policy
e⁄ects through z. Since (b;q) are increasing functions of z, a higher ￿ causes both to rise,
19which further leads to a positive e⁄ect on both margins as is shown by Figure 3. The
boost to the margins results in a rise in both output and labor. Finally, the policy e⁄ects
on output and labor in the frictionless market are standard. The monetary policy has no
e⁄ect on either aggregate and the ￿scal policy imposes a negative e⁄ect on them. I omit
their numerical characterizations due to limited space.
The positive relationship between in￿ ation and output in the top left panel of Figure
4 is in strong contrast to the results from the previous literature. Typically, a monetary
search model either delivers a negative in￿ ation-output relationship or a hump-shape one.
This is because ￿at money is required as a medium of exchange in such models. As a
result, in￿ ation tax eventually will bring down output as in￿ ation gets severe. Similarly,
cash-in-advance models typically ￿nd a negative relationship between in￿ ation and out-
put.7 In contrast, here in this model money is used for precautionary purposes rather than
transaction purposes. Households can use money and/or ￿rm credit to buy goods. In￿ a-
tion causes households to increase their desired trading probabilities and to decrease their
precautionary savings, the latter of which is obvious from the top middle panel in Figure
2 ￿ B. Therefore, at very high in￿ ation rates, precautionary savings go to zero. More-
over, the trading probabilities for a buyer in the frictional market approach one and thus
households carry little unspent money balances over time. Together, the entire economy
functions as if it were a cash-less economy. As a result, output increases with in￿ ation and
stays ￿ at at very high money growth rates. This is consistent with the empirical ￿ndings
for the U.S. and some other countries, suggesting a positive long-run relationship between
in￿ ation and output at low in￿ ation rates and little e⁄ects at high in￿ ation rates (see King
and Watson, 1992; Bullard and Keating, 1995; McCandless and Weber, 1995; Ahmed and
Rogers, 2000; Rapach, 2003).
Wealth distribution.
S4. In￿ ation has a negative e⁄ect on average wealth while income taxation has a positive
e⁄ect on it. The e⁄ect of in￿ ation on wealth dispersion depends on the income tax
rate. The positive e⁄ect tends to dominate at lower tax rates while the negative
e⁄ect tends to dominate at higher tax rates.8 Given money growth, income taxation
reduces wealth dispersion.
7Molico (2006) reports a hump-shape relationship between in￿ ation and output in a search environment
with endogenous money distributions. Camera and Chien (2011) ￿nd a negative relationship between
in￿ ation and output in a cash-in-advance environment with endogenous money distributions. Moreover,
the negative e⁄ect of in￿ ation on output by no means limits to models with heterogeneous agents. It is
also common among monetary models with degenerate money distributions.
8This is in contrast with the results from the theoretical literature that examines the distributional
e⁄ect of monetary policy. For example, in a search-theoretic model with bargaining, Molico (2006) shows
that dispersion in money holdings ￿rst decreases and then increases as the in￿ ation rate rises. Moreover,
20Figure 5 depicts the policy e⁄ect of in￿ ation on wealth distribution. Here a household￿ s
wealth is interpreted as its beginning-of-period real money balances after receiving the
government transfer T given by equation (49). Therefore, the average wealth consists of
aggregate precautionary savings, aggregate unspent balances and the transfer. Recall from
S2 that higher in￿ ation causes households to save less (lower h) and spend more (higher z)
at a higher frequency (higher b). Thus in￿ ation decreases aggregate savings. Its e⁄ect on
aggregate unspent balances can be ambiguous. On one hand, households plan on spending
more, which means the level of unspent balances held by a household is also higher. On the
other hand, households also choose to trade with a higher probability, which reduces the
chance of holding an unspent balance across periods. The government transfer includes the
monetary component to achieve money growth and the ￿scal component from taxation on
labor income. Both components increase with in￿ ation. The former is because of money
injection and the latter is because aggregate labor increases as in￿ ation rises. Overall,
the negative e⁄ect of in￿ ation dominates, which indicates that the negative impact of
in￿ ation on precautionary savings is the dominating force. Now consider the positive
relationship between income taxation and average wealth. Recall from S2 that taxation
makes households save more (higher h) and spend less (lower z) at a lower frequency (lower
b). Moreover, higher tax rates reduce aggregate labor and thus the ￿scal component of
government transfers. Altogether, the positive e⁄ect of income taxation dominates, which
again is likely to the result of the dominating e⁄ect on precautionary savings.
Now consider the policy e⁄ects on the coe¢ cient of variation of wealth. Since all
households receive the same amount of transfers, wealth dispersion critically depends on
the dispersion of precautionary savings and unspent balances. A rise in in￿ ation tends to
increase dispersion in household unspent balances (due to trading frictions) but decrease
dispersion in household savings, which is suggested to a certain extent in Figure 2 by the
changes in the functions z (￿) and h(￿) under various policy regimes. Nevertheless, as the
tax rate rises, households increase savings, which allows the e⁄ect of in￿ ation on savings
to make a stronger presence. As is shown by the top right panel of Figure 5, the positive
e⁄ect of in￿ ation on dispersion in household unspent balances tends to dominate when the
tax rate is low (e.g. ￿ = 0). Then at higher tax rates, the negative e⁄ect on savings tends
to dominate. In contrast, income taxation unambiguously decreases wealth dispersion.
Chiu and Molico (2010) establish a negative relationship between in￿ ation and the dispersion of the
money distribution. In a model where heterogeneous agents use money to self-insure against liquidity
shocks, Dressler (2011) demonstrates that in￿ ation increases dispersion in money balances. In a cash-in-
advance environment with heterogeneous agents, Camera and Chien (2011) show that in￿ ation reduces
wealth dispersion when money is the only asset, but has little e⁄ect on wealth inequality when bonds are
introduced. Moreover, none of the above papers consider the relevance of a ￿scal policy regime.
21Income and consumption inequalities.
S5. In￿ ation has a negative e⁄ect on income inequality but a positive e⁄ect on consump-
tion inequality.9 Income taxation has a positive e⁄ect on both income inequality and
consumption inequality.
Figure 6 reports policy e⁄ects on the respective coe¢ cients of variation of household
disposable income and consumption. In￿ ation reduces income inequality because of the
redistributive e⁄ect of lump-sum transfers to sustain money growth. This negative e⁄ect
strengthens with higher taxes because income taxation suppresses the incentives to supply
labor. This accentuates the redistributive e⁄ect of in￿ ation. In￿ ation increases consump-
tion inequality because it stimulates participation in the frictional market. Income taxation
increases income inequality. One interpretation is that the negative impact of taxation on
aggregate labor income overpowers its e⁄ect on the standard deviation of income. Income
taxation has a positive e⁄ect on consumption inequality, which is likely to be related to its
in￿ uence on income inequality.
Welfare.
S6. There can be a hump-shape relationship between in￿ ation and welfare at a given tax
rate. The welfare-improving role of in￿ ation strengthens as the tax rate increases.
Similarly, there is a hump-shape relationship between income taxation and welfare
at a given in￿ ation rate.
Figure 7 illustrates the welfare e⁄ects. Welfare is de￿ned as the weighted average of the
life-time discounted value W given by (7). In￿ ation has a positive welfare e⁄ect through
the following channels: increasing output, reducing income inequality, and reducing wealth
inequality at higher tax rates. On the other hand, in￿ ation also has a negative welfare
e⁄ects by reducing savings, increasing consumption inequality and increasing wealth dis-
persion at lower tax rates. Overall, at a given tax rate, in￿ ation can improve welfare at
lower money growth rates but reduce welfare at higher rates. The higher the tax rate,
the more prominent the positive e⁄ect of in￿ ation on welfare. Income taxation also has
both positive and negative impacts on welfare. The positive welfare e⁄ect of taxation
comes through increasing savings and decreasing wealth inequality. The negative e⁄ect of
9Camera and Chien (2011) also show that in￿ ation lowers income inequality. Nevertheless, there is no
consensus in the empirical literature relating in￿ ation to income distribution. Galli and Hoeven (2001)
provide an extensive review over this literature and refer to the mixed results as the ￿in￿ ation-inequality
puzzle￿ . Also in Camera and Chien (2011), lower in￿ ation can increase consumption inequality when
agents are not allowed to borrow.
22taxation includes decreasing output and increasing income and consumption inequalities.
Altogether, at a given in￿ ation rate, income taxation can also improve welfare at lower tax
rates but end up reducing it at higher tax rates.
The results in S1-S6 are robust to variation of parameter values satisfying the restriction
that the labor choices of all households are strictly positive. For the sake of limited space,
I only report in Table 1 the optimal monetary and ￿scal policies under various parameter
values. The benchmark case is given in (37). For each of the other cases, only the parameter
value(s) di⁄erent from the benchmark case is(are) listed. In the benchmark, the optimal
policy regime is ￿￿ = 0:98 and ￿￿ = 0:1. The optimal policy seems very sensitive to
changes in the variability of the ￿-shock. Recall ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ ￿ = 1:5 in the benchmark.
All else equal and keeping E (￿) = 1 constant, the optimal policy goes from ￿￿ = 0:96
and ￿￿ = 0:03 given ￿ 2 [0:8;1:2], to ￿￿ = 1:01 and ￿￿ = 0:17 given ￿ 2 [0:3;1:7], and to
￿￿ = 1:03 and ￿￿ = 0:22 given ￿ 2 [0:2;1:8]. Since in￿ ation has no e⁄ect on real activities
in the frictionless market whatsoever, all of the non-trivial e⁄ects of long-run in￿ ation
summarized in S1-S6 are due to trading frictions. This suggests that the trading frictions
can play an important role in reconciling empirical observations on the macroeconomy.
It is clear that monetary and ￿scal policies often have opposite yet asymmetric e⁄ects
on macro aggregates. Money growth directly a⁄ects the intertemporal consumption choices
while income taxation directly a⁄ects labor choices across idiosyncratic states. To maximize
welfare, a policy maker must choose the policy pair such that they optimally augment each
other￿ s positive welfare e⁄ects. If the monetary and ￿scal authorities are independent of
each other, a policy change by one often implies that the other should adjust its policy
accordingly. For example, in the benchmark case, the optimal money growth rate is ￿￿ =
0:96 given ￿ = 0, ￿￿ = 0:98 given ￿ = 0:1, and ￿￿ = 1 given ￿ = 0:25.
6 Conclusion
I have constructed a tractable framework of competitive search that endogenously gener-
ates dispersion of prices, income and wealth. This model is used to study the implications
of monetary and ￿scal policies in an environment with heterogeneous agents. With com-
petitive search, a household￿ s decision problems can be solved independently from the
endogenous wealth distribution, which brings the model signi￿cant tractability. Analytical
and quantitative results suggest that monetary and ￿scal policies have distinctive e⁄ects
on real activities and welfare. Welfare-maximization requires an optimal policy mix. If
the monetary and ￿scal authorities are separate identities, a change of policy by one has a
non-trivial implication on the optimal policy choice of the other.
23Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2
Given (24), it is straightforward to see that the value function B (z) is continuous. More-
over, B (z) ￿ 0 for all z ￿ 0, where the equality holds if and only if b = 0. If b = 0, the
choice of q is irrelevant. Since B is continuous on a closed interval [0; ^ z], the lotteries in
(30) make ~ V concave (see Appendix F in Menzio and Shi, 2010b, for a proof). I prove
di⁄erentiability of ~ V in the proof of part (iii).
For part (i), de￿ne the left-hand side of (17) as LHS (b) and impose x = z:









where q is given by (18) with x = z. It is straightforward to derive that
LHS (b = 0) = u
￿
 
￿1 (z ￿ k)
￿
￿ ￿E (￿)z;
= u(q) ￿ ￿E (￿)[  (q) + k];
where (18) yields q =  
￿1 (z ￿ k) given b = 0. Thus the above implies that LHS (b = 0) >
0 if and only if there exists q > 0 such that condition (27) holds. Moreover, one can further
derive LHS (b = 1) = ￿1, and
LHS

























Given all the above results, condition (27) implies that there exists z > 0 such that b > 0.
Furthermore, the above results imply that the policy function b(z) is unique, which further




￿ ￿E (￿) > 0: (39)







￿ ￿E (￿) +
kb￿0 (b)[u00 (q) 





3 > 0: (40)
24This implies that an increase of z shifts the entire function LHS (b) upwards. Because
LHS0 (b) < 0, it follows that b0 (z) > 0 for all z such that b > 0. Given b > 0, (17) holds
with equality. Total di⁄erentiating (17) by z yields
0 = u
0 (q)q
0 (z) ￿ ￿E (￿) +
kb￿0 (b)[u00 (q) 



















Given b0 (z) > 0 and Assumption 1, rearranging the above yields q0 (z) > 0 for all z such
that b > 0. Given b > 0, one can derive that
B
0 (z) = b








This is because b0 (z) > 0 and the trade surplus, u(q (z)) ￿ ￿zE (￿), is strictly positive
given b > 0, and also condition (39). Obviously, b(z) is strictly decreasing in E (￿), given
the results about LHS (b) in part (ii). Then (29) implies that q (z) is strictly increasing in
E (￿).
For part (ii), note that the previous proof has established that b(z) is continuous and
increasing in all z 2 [0; ^ z]. In particular, b(z) is strictly increasing in z if b > 0. It is
obvious from (18) that b(z) = 0 for all z 2 [0;k]. Continuity of b(z) implies that there
exists z1 > k such that b(z) = 0 for all z 2 [0;z1] and b(z) > 0 for all z > z1.
I now prove part (iii) and the di⁄erentiability of ~ V together. If b(z) = 0 for all z,
then obviously ~ V (z) is di⁄erentiable. Now consider the case where there exists z such that
b(z) > 0, i.e., condition (27) holds. It is obvious that B (z) is di⁄erentiable for all z such
that b(z) > 0. Consider z such that b(z) > 0. Recall that a concave function has both left-
hand and right-hand derivatives (see Royden, 1988, pp113-114). Let ~ V 0 (z￿) and ~ V 0 (z+) be
the left-hand and right-hand derivatives, respectively. Suppose ~ V 0 (z￿) > ~ V 0 (z+) for some
z such that b(z) > 0. Then ~ V is strictly concave at such z, which implies ~ V (z) = B (z). It
follows that B0 (z￿) ￿ ~ V 0 (z￿) > ~ V 0 (z+) ￿ B0 (z+), where the ￿rst and the last inequalities
follow from the construction of lotteries. However, B0 (z￿) > B0 (z+) contradicts the
di⁄erentiability of B. Therefore, the value function ~ V (z) is di⁄erentiable for all z such
that b(z) > 0. Part (ii) has established that there exists z1 > k such that b(z) = 0 for











> 0 because b(z) > 0 in the right
neighborhood of z1. Therefore, B is strictly convex but not di⁄erentiable at z1 because
0 = B0 (z￿) < B0 (z+). Strict convexity of B at z1 implies that there is a lottery over the
25region z 2 [0;z1]. Let the winning prize of this lottery be z0. Then all households with
z 2 (0;z0) will play this lottery and receive zero payment if they lose. Moreover, it must
be the case that z0 > z1, b(z0) > b(z1) > 0 and B (z0) = ~ V (z0) > 0. Given b(z0) > 0,
both value functions are di⁄erentiable at z0 and B0 (z0) = ~ V 0 (z0) > 0. Therefore, ~ V is
di⁄erentiable for all z 2 [0;z0] because of the lottery. Moreover, ~ V is also di⁄erentiable for
all z > z0 because b > 0 for all z > z0. QED
B Proof of Theorem 2
Recall the normalized wage rate w￿ as given in (33). Note that all the policy functions on
the right-hand side of (33) are independent of w￿. Thus w￿ > 0 obviously exists. It follows
that a stationary equilibrium exists and is characterized by w￿. It is unique if and only if
the lottery choices fL1 (z (￿));L2 (z (￿));￿1 (z (￿));￿2 (z (￿))g are unique for all z (￿). Part
(i) follows from (11). For part (ii), recall from Lemma 2 that there exists z > 0 such that
the policy function b(z) > 0 if any only if condition (27) holds for some q > 0. Therefore,
if (27) does not hold, then b(z) = 0 for all z. Moreover, B(z) = B0(z) = ~ V (z) = ~ V 0(z) = 0
for all z. In this case, the household never trades in the frictional market, which renders no
need to hold a positive balance for transaction purposes. Thus z (￿) = 0 for all ￿. Consider
the case where condition (27) holds for some q > 0. In this case, there exists z > 0 such
that the policy function b(z) > 0, according to Lemma 2. Note that condition (9) implies
that z (￿) > 0 if Vz (0;h) ￿ ￿. If Vz (0;h) < ￿, then z (￿) = 0 is optimal. If z (￿) > 0,
b(L2 (z (￿))) > 0 follows from construction of the lottery. QED
C Proof of Proposition 1
Given policies ￿ and ￿, the household￿ s decision problem is given by:
W (m;￿) = max
(y;l;z;h)
fU (y) ￿ ￿l + V (z;h)g
s:t: y + z + h ￿ m + (1 ￿ ￿)l + T:




















V (z;h) = ~ V (z) + ￿E [W (0;￿)] +
￿E (￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
(z + h) (42)
26~ V (z) = max
(L1;L2;￿1;￿2)
f￿1B (L1) + ￿2B (L2)g (43)
s:t: ￿1L1 + ￿2 L2 = z; L2 ￿ L1 ￿ 0;
￿1 + ￿2 = 1; ￿i 2 [0;1] for i = 1;2



















It follows immediately that policy functions b(z) and q (z) are given by (34) and (35).
De￿ne the left-hand side of (34) as
LHSP (b) ￿ u(q) ￿
￿E (￿)










where q is given by (35). Following the same procedure as the proof of Lemma 2, one can
show that Lemma 2 also applies to this case with policies ￿ and ￿, except that condition
(27) is replaced by
u(q) ￿
￿E (￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
[  (q) + k] > 0; (46)
and (28) and (29) replaced by (34) and (35). As is the case with LHS0 (b) < 0, we have
LHSP 0 (b) < 0. Then parts (i) and (ii) of this proposition follow trivially given b > 0.
For part (iii), to analyze policy e⁄ects on z, note from (41), (42), (43) and (44) that




~ V (z) +





It is clear from part (ii) of Lemma 2 that b(z) > 0 implies z > 0. Consider interior choice
of z < ￿ m, which satis￿es the following ￿rst-order condition:
~ V
0 (z) +
￿E (￿)=￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
= 0:
Given the lottery, if ~ V (z) is strictly concave at z, then ~ V (z) = B (z) and ~ V 0 (z) = B0 (z).
Moreover, the optimal choice of z satis￿es
B
0 (z) +

























￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
3
5 +
￿E (￿)=￿ ￿ ￿
1 ￿ ￿
= 0: (47)
27If ~ V (z) is linear at z, then a lottery is employed at z. In this case, ~ V 0 (z) is trivially
determined by the slopes of ~ V at the lottery prize points, L1 (z) and L2 (z). At both of
these points, ~ V (z) is strictly concave. Without loss of generality, I focus on z such that
(47) holds and B00 (z) < 0.









￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+
kb￿0 (b)[u00 (q) 











(1 ￿ b)￿E (￿)=￿ ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)
2 d￿: (48)






￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
> 0
and that the term within the square bracket of (48) is strictly positive. Then (??) implies
that ￿ > ￿E (￿)=￿ > (1 ￿ b)￿E (￿)=￿. Moreover, we have @b
@￿ < 0 according to part (i) of
this proposition. Given B00 (z) < 0, the above equation implies that dz













￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+
kb￿0 (b)[u00 (q) 











(1 ￿ b)￿E (￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 d￿:
where q =  
￿1 (z ￿ k=￿(b)). Again, the term within the square bracket is strictly positive.
Moreover, we have @b
@￿ > 0 according to part (ii) of this proposition. Given B00 (z) < 0, the
above equation implies that dz







￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
+
kb￿0 (b)[u00 (q) 










(1 ￿ b)￿E (￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 > 0:
The above part (iii) shows that z is strictly decreasing in ￿. Moreover, part (i) of
Lemma 2 that the policy functions b(z) and q (z) are strictly increasing in z. Thus, the
￿scal policy has a negative indirect e⁄ect on both margins through its e⁄ect on z. The













@￿ < 0, b0 (z) > 0 and
@z(￿;￿)
@￿ < 0 for all z such that b(z) > 0. Then rest of the
results in this proposition follow trivially. QED
D Government Transfers and Market Clearing
In this Appendix, I further characterize the market-clearing conditions and the formula for
the government transfer. The analysis in this Appendix is carried out with the monetary
and ￿scal policies. For the benchmark case without any policy, one can simply apply ￿ = 1
and ￿ = 0 to all the derivations in what follows.
With policies, the de￿nition of a stationary equilibrium must satisfy one more condi-
tion that the government balances its budget every period. For money growth, the house-
hold receives a dollar amount of (￿ ￿ 1)M, which is equivalent to (￿ ￿ 1)M=(wM0) =
(￿ ￿ 1)=(w￿) units of labor. For income taxation, the amount of the government transfer














y (￿)dF (￿): (50)
The market-clearing condition for the labor market is aggregate demand for labor, LD,
is equal to aggregate supply of labor, LS. Consider LD ￿rst. A household￿ s realization
of ￿ determines the money balance z (￿). Given this money balance, the resulted money
balance after lotteries is Li (z (￿)), i = 1;2, which takes place with probability ￿i (z (￿)).
Thus the measure of such households is Nb (￿;i) = ￿i (z (￿))dF (￿). The measure of shops
corresponding to the households holding Li (z (￿)) is given by
Ns (￿;i) = ￿i (z (￿))dF (￿)b(Li (z (￿)))=[￿(b(Li (z (￿))))];
which is derived from b=￿(b) = Ns=Nb given the constant-return-to-scale matching tech-
nology. Then for each shop, the expected labor demand is k +  (q)￿(b), which is used to
29compute the aggregate demand for labor in the frictional market. Thus, LD is given by





￿i (z (￿))b(Li (z (￿)))
￿(b(Li (z (￿))))
[k +   (q (Li (z (￿))))￿(b(Li (z (￿))))]dF (￿):
(51)
The ￿rm￿ s zero-pro￿t condition (3) implies that for i = 1;2,
k +   (q (Li (z (￿))))￿(b(Li (z (￿)))) = Li (z (￿))￿(b(Li (z (￿)))):









￿i (z (￿))b(Li (z (￿)))Li (z (￿))dF (￿): (52)














[py (￿) + z (￿) + h(￿) ￿ m ￿ T
￿]dF (￿)dGa (m):
Use (49) to substitute for T ￿ in the above. Also recall the constraint for the household￿ s
lottery choice, ￿1 (z (￿))L1 (z (￿)) + ￿2 (z (￿))L2 (z (￿)) = z (￿). It follows that
￿













The household￿ s beginning-of-the-period balance m consists of precautionary savings and

















The labor-market clearing requires LD = LS. Thus (52)-(54) together solve for the nor-

















￿i (z (￿))[1 ￿ b(Li (z (￿)))]Li (z (￿))dF (￿): (55)
Note that the formula in (33) is clearly given by setting ￿ = 0 in the above equation. Given
that the labor market clears, the money market clears by Walras￿law.
31Figure 2. Policy functions
A. The lottery choice

















































































32Figure 3. Aggregate intensive and extensive margins
A. Average quantity per trade B. Volume of transactions
Figure 4. Output and labor and in the frictional market
A. output B. labor
33Figure 5. Wealth distribution
A. Average wealth B. Coe¢ cient of variation of wealth
Figure 6. Income and consumption inequalities
A. Income inequality B. Consumption inequality
34Figure 7. Welfare
Table 1. Optimal policy
Parameters ￿￿ ￿ ￿ Parameters ￿￿ ￿ ￿
benchmark 0:98 0:1 ￿u = 0:5 0:99 0:18
k = 10￿3 0:97 0:1 U0 = 12 0:99 0:11
k = 0:5 1 0:07 U0 = 100 0:98 0:07
￿ = 0:5 0:98 0:08 ￿ 2 [0:8;1:2] 0:96 0:03
￿ = 1:5 0:98 0:1 ￿ 2 [0:3;1:7] 1:01 0:17
￿u = 1:01 0:98 0:1 ￿ 2 [0:2;1:8] 1:03 0:22
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